THE FIRST MEMORANDUM - Addressed to
the German Government
Introduction – The Narrative of the Entente and the
Missing Retort
The
spokesmen of the Entente advance among the reasons why they must continue the
war the notion that they have been attacked by Germany. They maintain that they
must therefore bring Germany to its knees so that from then onwards every
possibility of it ever mounting an attack again would be taken away. All the
other causes of this war are nebulously submerged in this sort of moral
accusation against Germany.
Undoubtedly, this accusation places
Germany in the necessary position to show in an unadorned fashion how it was
driven into the war. Instead, there have only been doctrinal clashes about the
causes of the war, which seem like the conclusions of a professor who does not
tell what he has seen, but outlines from documentary sources what occurred to him
about distant events. Then in this way have all the statements by the Reich
Chancellor been made about the events during the outbreak of the war. Such
explanations, however, are not suitable for making any impression. They are
simply rejected by opposing them with other unjustified or justified
viewpoints.
Analysis of the Events According to Rudolf Steiner
If, on
the contrary, the facts were simply told, the following would result:
1. Germany was in the summer of 1914
not prepared to take the initiative for starting a war ;
2. Austria-Hungary was for a long
time put in the necessary position to do something against the increasing
danger of losing part of her territory through the combined action of the
Southern Slavs under the leadership of the non-Austrian South-eastern Slavs. It is easy to admit that the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand
and the whole history of the ultimatum was only an occasion. Had this occasion
not been seized, another would have had to be taken at the earliest opportunity.
Austria could not have remained Austria, if it did not do something to secure
its southeastern provinces, or by means of a generous other action that could
resolve the Slavic question. Austrian politics, however, has since 1879 bled to
death from this other action. Or rather, she bled to death due to the fact that this other action could
not be found. One could simply not master the Slavic question. In so far as for
the outbreak of the war Austria-Hungary is concerned (and thereby also Germany
that became involved because it could not leave Austria-Hungary without the
fear that after a few years it would be opposed by the Entente without the
Austrian Confederation) in so far it must be recognized that the Slavic
question contains the ground for the outbreak of this war. The "other
action" is therefore the international solution to the Slavic question. It
is demanded from Austria, not from Russia. For Russia will always be able to
throw her basic Slavic character into the balance of the solution. Austria-Hungary
can only counter this weight by the liberation
of the Western Slavs. This liberation can only proceed from the viewpoint of
the autonomisation of all branches of the life of the people which concern its
national existence and everything that is connected to it. One should not
shrink away from complete freedom in
the sense of the autonomisation and federalization of national life. This
federalization is prefigured in the German federal states that, to a certain
extent, is the historically prefigured model for that which must be continued
to the point of a completely federalist-libertarian configuration of all those
living conditions that have their source in the human being itself, i.e. that
are not directly dependent, such as the military-political establishment, on
the geographical conditions, and, such as the economic sphere, dependent on the
geographical-opportunistic conditions. The configuration of these conditions
will only then come about in a healthy manner, if nationality is dispensed from
freedom and not freedom dispensed from nationality. If instead of the latter
one strives for the former, then one places oneself within the course of world
history. If one wants the former, then one works against this evolution and
lays the groundwork for new conflicts and wars.
To demand that the leaders of Austria
should therefore have omitted the ultimatum to Serbia, would mean demanding
from them that they should have acted against the interest of their country.
Theorists of any kind can make such a demand. A person who reckons with the
facts available ought not to speak seriously at all of such things. For if the
Southern Slavs had reached what the leading advocates of Greater Serbia wanted,
then Austria, through the actions of the other Austrian Slavs, would not have
remained in the form that she existed. One could still imagine that Austria
would then have assumed a different form. Can one, however, suggest that a
leading Austrian statesman patiently resign himself to such an outcome? It
would seem so, if only one were of the opinion that it is part of the absolute
requirements of an Austrian statesman to be a pacifist and fatalistically await
the fate of the empire. Under any other condition one must understand the step
that Austria took with regard to the ultimatum.
3. Once Austria had made the ultimatum, the further course of events could
only to be halted if Russia were to remain passive. As soon as Russia took an
aggressive step, nothing could have stopped the consequences.
4. Just as true as all this is, it
is equally true that everyone, who had reckoned with the facts, had a vague
feeling in Germany: If the implied
complications were to enter a critical phase, then there would be war. One
would not be able to escape this war. And responsible persons held the opinion
that, if necessary, one would have to fight this war with all one’s might. To
fight a war out of one’s own initiative was certainly not the intention of any
responsible person in Germany. One can prove to the Entente that they had not
the slightest reason to believe in a war of aggression on the part of Germany.
They can be compelled to admit that they held the belief that Germany would
become so powerful without a war that this power would jeopardize the powers
now united in the Entente. But such political evidence will have to be put forward
quite differently from what has hitherto been the case; because the latter is
not a political argument, but only the deployment of political assertions,
which the others may deign to find brutal. On the part of the powers of the
Entente it was believed that if things
were to continue in this way, one could not know what else was still to become
of Germany; therefore a war with Germany was inevitable. Germany could take the
view: we do not need to go to war; but without war we shall attain what the states
of the Entente will not allow without going to war; therefore we must be
prepared for this war and, when it is threatening, deal with it in such a way
that we cannot be harmed by it. This also applies to the Serbian question and
to Austria. In 1914, Austria could no longer cope with Serbia without going to
war, at least that had to be the conviction of its statesmen. But if the
Entente had decided that Austria-Hungary
could be let alone to cope with Serbia, there would not have been any
world war. The true reason for the war must therefore not be sought by the
Central Powers, but by the fact that the Entente did not want to leave these
powers as they were in their balance of
power after 1914. If, however, the above-mentioned "other
action" had been taken before 1914, then the Serbs would not have
developed an international opposition to Austria-Hungary, and neither the
ultimatum nor the interference by Russia could have occurred. And if Russia had
at any time, for pure reasons of conquest, turned against Central Europe, then
England could not have been at her
side. Since the submarine was until the war a pure means of warfare, and since
America had absolutely not been able
to enter into war with the European Central Powers without this means of
warfare, only England needs to be taken into account regarding the question of
peace in the sense indicated.
5. What should now be communicated
to the world is:
(a) that Germany, as far as the
persons concerned who were responsible for deciding to go to war, was completely
surprised by the events of July 1914 that no one had foreseen. This is
especially true of the attitude of Russia;
(b) that the responsible persons in
Germany could not help but assume that if Russia were to attack, France would
do the same;
(c) that in this case Germany had
for years been preparing its war on two fronts and that in the face of the
precipitating events could do no more than to put it into effect, if did not
obtain from the West a definite guarantee that France would not attack. This
guarantee could only come from England;
(d) that if England had given this
guarantee, Germany would have only gone to war against Russia;
(e) that the German diplomacy had
believed that Britain would act in the sense of such a guarantee as a result of
the relationship which it had established with England in the last few years;
(f) that the German diplomacy has
completely deceived itself with regard to the forthcoming policy of England,
and that under the impression of this deception the march through Belgium was
put into operation, which would not have been done had England given the indicated
guarantee. It must be proclaimed in a
very unambiguous way to the world that the invasion of Belgium was only put
into operation when the German diplomacy had been surprised by the news from
the King of England, that it was deceiving itself if it were to wait for a
guarantee on the part of England. It is incomprehensible why the German
government does not unambiguously do what it can: to prove that it would not
have carried out the invasion of Belgium if the decisive telegram from the King
of England had been different. The whole further course of the war really
depended on this decisive turn of events, and nothing has been undertaken by
Germany to bring this decisive fact to the general knowledge of the world. If
this fact was known correctly, one would have to say that the English policy
was indeed wrongly judged at decisive positions of power in Germany, but one
could not ignore the fact that England was the determining factor in the
Belgian question. One difficulty, however, would pose such a language by
Germany with respect to Russia, because it would make her see what she owed
England for this war. This difficulty could only be remedied if Germany could succeed
in showing Russia that she has less to expect from a friendship with England
than from one with Germany. This, of course, cannot be done without Germany
developing at the present moment a generous policy, in accord with
Austria-Hungary, by which the program of Wilson, which has been put into the
world without knowledge of the European situation, will be thrown out.
Causes of the war
It may
seem practical to say that it is not worthwhile today to talk about the causes
of the war. This is, however, considering the actual circumstances the most
impractical thing to do. For in fact, the Entente with its portrayal of the causes of war has long been waging war. The
situation which it has created for itself is due to the circumstance that its
portrayal is believed thanks to the fact that something effective has not yet
been launched against it by Germany. While Germany could show that it had contributed nothing to the outbreak of the
war, that it was driven to violate the neutrality against Belgium only by the
conduct of England, the official statements of Germany are so far still held to
the effect that no human being living outside Germany is hindered to form the
judgment that it was in Germany's hand not to begin the war. It is not
sufficient that the documents are compiled in the way that they were. For this
compilation produces something which can be doubted by everyone, whereas the
unvarnished account of the facts would indeed result in Germany's innocence.
One who understands such things can know that such speeches as are held by
those responsible in Germany are not at all understood by the hearts and minds
of the people in the hostile countries, nor even in the neutral ones, and are
therefore only taken as veils of the truth. One would only have a right to say
that it was of no use to speak differently against the hatred of enemies, if
one had only made an attempt to really speak differently. This hatred should
not be brought to bear at all, because this is simply naive; for this hate is
only the drapery of the war, is only the clearing of slime of those who want to
or must accompany the unspeakably sad events with their speeches, or those who
seek in the inflammation of this hatred an effective means of achieving this
and that. The war is waged from well-known causes on the part of France and
Russia. And it is waged by England only as an economic war; but as an economic
war, which is a result of all that has been prepared in England for a long
time. To speak in the face of the realities of the English policy of
encirclement by King Edward, and similar trifles, is as if one saw a boy run
away from a peg which afterwards falls down, and then says that the boy had
caused the peg to fall because he had shaken it a little, while the peg had
indeed been so severely damaged, that the boy only needed to give it a little
push to finally cause the fall. The truth is that for many years England knows how
to pursue a policy orientated on the
real conditions in Europe in a sense that seemed to be to its advantage, which was like a natural scientific exploitation
of the powers inherent in existing peoples and states. Nowhere else than in
England did politics assume a completely objective, coherent character. Take
the volatile forces of the people of the Balkans, add to that what was playing
in Austria, and look from there at what political formulas were present in
initiated circles in England. These formulas always contained: this and that is
going to happen in the Balkans; England has to react to it in this way. And as the
events moved in the direction indicated, English politics moved parallel to it.
It was possible to find sentences like these in England enclosed in such
formulas: The Russian Empire will fall in its present form, so that the Russian
people can live. And the conditions of this country are such that it is
possible to carry out socialist experiments there for which there is no
possibility in Western Europe. Whoever follows the policy of England can see
that it has always been carried out on a grand scale so as to turn all such and
many other points of view into the interests of England. And in doing so, it
benefited from the fact that it was the only one in Europe proceeding from
such points of view, just thereby enabling
it to gain its diplomatic advantages. Its policy always worked in the sense of
what the real national and state forces were, and its endeavor was in this
sense to utilize these forces to its economic advantage. It worked to its
advantage. Others do this as well, of course. But England worked furthermore in
the direction of what might be realized by the forces lying within it, while
others would not get involved in observing such forces, and indeed would only
have had a gentle smile if one would have mentioned such forces. England's entire state structure is
completely geared to such truly practical work. Others will only then be able
to develop something to match this English statesmanship, when the fore-going
will no longer be an English secret, but when it has become common property.
Just imagine how infinitely naive it was to have believed that Germany was able
to get its way with the Baghdad railway problem,
since from that point on the problem was handled as if it were only necessary
to proceed to something like the construction of a street that had been agreed
to with its neighbors. Or, in order to speak of something still further away,
how was Austria planning to straighten out its relation with the Balkans
without bringing powers to bear which, viewed from the national and political
forces of the Balkans, could paralyze the trumps of England? England, at a
given time, did not only do this and that, but directed the forces
internationally in such a way that they were moving at the right moment in its direction. In order to do this, one
must first get to know these forces,
and secondly, to develop these forces in oneself. Austria-Hungary, therefore,
should at the right time have carried out an action which, in the sense of the
Southern Slavic forces, would have brought these in the Austrian direction, and
Germany should have, in the sense of the economic-opportunistic powers, brought
the Baghdad railway interests in its direction, instead of the former having
diverted to the Russian and thereby the Russian-English line and the latter to
the English line.
The war must lead in Central Europe to
an understanding about what exists within the national, political, and economic
life. Only then can England be compelled
not to continue behaving towards the other states by means of a superior
diplomacy, but to allow itself to be treated on an equal footing about what is
to be negotiated between European human communities. Without fulfilling this
condition, all imitation of English parliamentarianism in Central Europe is
nothing more than a means for throwing sand in one’s eyes. In England, a few
people will otherwise always find ways and means to have their realpolitik pushed
through by parliament, while a German and Austrian action is, after all, not
only bound to fail by the fact that, instead of a few statesmen before an
assembly, 500 members of parliament will decide on it. One can scarcely think
of anything more unfortunate than the superstition that it will create wonders
when, in addition to the rest that one has put up with from England, one now
lets also the democratic stereotype be forced upon by it. This is not to say
that Central Europe should not develop further in the sense of an internal
political formation, only this must not be an imitation of West-European
so-called democratism, but it must bring to bear precisely what this
democratism in Central Europe, because of its special conditions, would
prevent. This so-called democratism is namely only suited to make the people of
Central Europe a part of the Anglo-American global hegemony and if, in addition
to that, one were get involved in the so-called intergovernmental organization
of the present internationalists, one would have as a Central European the
beautiful prospect of always being overridden in this intergovernmental organization.
What it comes down to
What it
comes down to is to show the real intrinsic impulses from the life of Central
European, and from which the Western adversaries, when these impulses are
demonstrated, will see that they will have to bleed to death from them during a
continuation of the war. Against pretensions
of power the opponents can pitch their
power and will do so, as long as it remains by pretensions. Against real power
they will lay down their arms. Wilson's so effective narratives must be
countered by what in Central Europe can really
be done for the liberation of the life of the people, whereas his words cannot
give nothing but Anglo-American global hegemony. The consensus with Russia need
not be sought by a Central European
program rooted in reality; because this will come about by itself. Such a
Central European program must not contain anything that is of internal concern of the state, but only
something that concerns external relationships. But, of course, the view in
this direction this must be objective, for whether a human being can think well
is certainly a matter of his internal organism, but whether he works outwardly
in this or that direction through this good thinking is not an internal matter.
Therefore, only a Central European
program can defeat the Wilsonian one that is rooted in reality, e.g. not
emphasizing this and that as desirable, but simply a description of what
Central Europe can, because it has the forces within itself to do this. This
includes:
1.
That it be realized: The object of a democratic parliament as the
representative body of the people can
only be the purely political, military
and national security (police) affairs. These are only possible due to the
historically formed background. If represented as such in a parliament and
administered in a civil service responsible to parliament, these affairs will
develop necessarily in a conservative
direction. An external proof of this is that since the outbreak of war even the
Social Democratic party has become conservative in these matters. And it will
become even more so, the more it is compelled to think sensibly and
appropriately by the fact that only political, military, and police affairs can
be the object in parliament as the representative body of the people. Within
such an institution, German individualism can also unfold itself with its
federal system, which is no coincidence, but inherent to the German national
character.
2. All economic matters are to be
regulated in a special economic
parliament. If this institution is relieved of all political and military
affairs, then it will develop its affairs purely in such a way that is solely
appropriate to it, namely opportunistically.
The administrative civil service of these economic affairs, in the area of
which also the whole customs legislation is situated, is directly responsible
only to the economic parliament.
3. All judicial, pedagogical,
cultural and spiritual affairs are left to the freedom of the people. The state
has in this domain only the right to police, not the initiative. What is meant
here only seems radical. In reality, only those can find fault with this who
cannot see the facts squarely in the eye. The state leaves it up to the
professional, business and national corporations, to set up their own law
courts, schools, churches etc. and it leaves it up to the individual to choose
his own school, his church and his judge. Of course not from case to case, but
for a certain time. In the beginning, this will probably have to be restricted
to territorial boundaries, but it includes the possibility to reconcile
national opposites – and others – peacefully. It even includes the possibility
of creating something real in stead of the shadowy national court of
arbitration. National or other agitators will thereby lose their powers
completely. No Italian in Trieste would find supporters in this city, if
everyone could develop their national identity in it, while nevertheless, for
obvious opportunistic reasons, his economic interests are arranged in Vienna,
and his gendarme is nevertheless paid for by Vienna.
The political structures of Europe
could thus develop on this basis a healthy conservatism, which can never be
concerned with the dismemberment of Austria, but at most with its expansion.
The economic structures can develop
in an opportunistically healthy manner; for no one can wish to have Trieste in
an economic structure in which it must perish economically if this economic
structure does not hinder anyone from freely pursuing ecclesiastical and national, matters and so
on. Cultural concerns are freed from the pressures exerted by them on economic
and political matters, and they cease to exert pressure on them. All these
cultural concerns are sustained in a healthy movement.
A sort senate, chosen from the three
corporate bodies, with the task of regulating the political-military, economic
and judicial-pedagogical affairs takes care of the common affairs including
e.g. the common finances.
No one who really thinks out of the
circumstances as they are in Central Europe will doubt the feasibility of what
is shown in this account. For here nothing at all is demanded which is to be
carried out, but only something is shown that wants be carried out, and which
will succeed the moment it is given free rein.
The war is a false flag operation
If this
is recognized, it becomes above all clear why we have this war and why, under
the false flag of national liberation, it is a war for the oppression of the
German people, in a broader sense for the suppression of all independent
national life in Central Europe. If one dismantles Wilson's program, which has
emerged as the most recent description of the cover-up programs of the Entente,
one realizes that its execution would mean nothing else than the destruction of
this Central European freedom. This does not prevent Wilson from talking about
the freedom of nations; for the world is not concerned with words but with
facts which follow from the realization of these words. Central Europe needs
real freedom, but Wilson does not speak about real freedom. The whole Western
world has absolutely no concept of this real freedom necessary for Central
Europe. One speaks of freedom of the people, and does not mean thereby the real
freedom of the human beings, but a chimerical collective freedom of human
connections as has been developed in the Western European states and in
America. According to the particular conditions of Central Europe, this
collective freedom cannot arise out of international conditions, thus it must
never ever be the subject of an international agreement as the basis of a peace
accord. In Central Europe the collective freedom of the peoples must arise from
general human freedom, and this will come about if the separation of all
spheres of life that are not part of the
purely political, military, and economic spheres is therefore given free
rein.
It is only natural that those who
always only reckon with their ideas and not with reality, raise such objections
to such a disentanglement as are found in a book just published, namely,
Krieck's Die deutsche Staatsidee (The German Idea of the State) on p.167:
"Sometimes in the past, an economic parliament alongside a parliament of
the people has been demanded, among
others by E. von Hartmann. This idea lies entirely in the direction of economic
and social development. But apart from the fact that a new big wheel would
increase the already awkwardness and friction of the machine, the jurisdiction
of both parliaments would be impossible to separate from each other."
It is noteworthy here that it must
be admitted that this idea of
disentanglement comes forth from the real course of evolution. It must
therefore be carried out and may not be rejected against the evolution, because its realization is found to be
difficult. If one resigns in the face of such
difficulties in reality, one creates implications, which are later violently
discharged. And ultimately this war with the peculiar course it is taken is the
discharge of difficulties, which should have been gotten rid of in other ways
properly, as long as there was still time.
The Wilsonian program aims to make
it impossible for the Central European states to realize their legitimate task
and living conditions in the world. It must be countered by showing what would
happen in Central Europe, if this is not prevented from happening by the
violent destruction of Central European life. The Entente must be shown what can only be done by
Central Europe here on the basis of what has become historical, provided it
does not side with the Entente, which can have no interest at all in directing
Central Europe to its natural development.
As things stand today, Germany and
Austria have only the choice between the following three things:
1. Under all circumstances to wait
for a victory of their arms, and by that means hope that they can carry out
their Central European task.
2. To negotiate a peace with the
Entente on the basis of the latter’s present program and thus to secure their
own destruction.
3. To say what they will regard as a
consequence of a peace based on realistic conditions, and thus to present the
world with the possibility to let the people, after a clear insight into the
conditions and will of Central Europe, choose between a factual program
bringing real freedom to the European man or woman and along with that, as a
matter of course, freedom to the people, or the illusionary programs of the
West and America that speak of freedom, but in fact make life impossible for
the whole of Europe.
German Militarism?
We in
Central Europe give for the time being the impression as if we were afraid of
telling the Western powers what we must want, while these powers are all but
overwhelming us with demonstrations of what they want. This makes it appear as
if only the West wants something for the salvation of mankind, and that we are
only anxious to disturb these laudable endeavors by all kinds of things such as
militarism. But our militarism is in effect a creation of the West, which for a
long time has been preparing and will even further plan to do so to turn us
into shadows of ourselves. Granted, these and similar things have often been
said before, but that is not the point. What matters is that they really become
the leitmotiv of Central European action, and that the world learns to
recognize that it can expect no action from Central Europe other than that it must reach for the sword when the others
force this sword into its hands.
What the Western nations now call
German militarism is something they have forged during centuries of
development, and it is only up to them, not to Germany, to withdraw the reason
of this militarism for Central Europe. It is up to Central Europe, however, to
clearly put forward its willingness for freedom, a willingness which cannot be
built in Wilson's sense on programs, but on the reality of human existence.
The Central European Peace Program versus Wilson’s
Program
There is
for Central Europe thus only one peace program and that is: to let the world
know that peace is immediately possible, if the Entente replaces its current,
untrue peace program with a true one which does not lead to the downfall of
Central Europe, but instead makes life possible. All other questions that may
become the subject of peace efforts are solved, if they are tackled on the
basis of these pre-conditions . On the basis of
what is now offered to us by the Entente, and which has been taken up by
Wilson, peace is impossible. If nothing else were to take its place, the German
people could only be brought to adopt this program by force, and the further
development of European history would prove the correctness of what has been
said here, for the realization of Wilson's program will result in the ruin of
the European peoples.
One has in Central Europe to look
without any illusion at what those personalities have held for many years as
their belief and what they view from their vantage point as the law of the
evolution of the world: that the future of the world’s evolution belongs to the
Anglo-American race, and that they are to take over the legacy of the
Latin-Roman race and the education of the Russian people. In the introduction
of this world political formula by an Englishman or an American, deeming
himself to be initiated, it is always remarked that the German element must
have no say in shaping the constitutional order of the world because of its
insignificance in world-political matters, that the Romanic element need not be
considered because it is dying out anyways and that the Russian element is
possessed by the one who makes himself its world-historical educator. One could
think not much of such a creed, if it lived in the heads of a few men prone to
political fantasies or utopias, but English policy used innumerable ways to
make this program practically the object of its global realpolitik, and from
England’s point of view the current coalition in which it finds itself cannot
be more favorable than it is when this program were to be implemented. There
is, however, nothing with which Central Europe can oppose it, other than a
program of truly human liberation, which can come into effect at any moment, if
human will is committed to its realization.
Possible Objections
It may perhaps
be thought that peace will be long delayed, even if the program which is meant
here is introduced to the European nations, since it can after all not be
carried out during the war. Moreover, it would be described by the Entente in
such a way that the leaders of Central Europe had merely set it up to deceive
the nations, while after the war the terrible things described by the leaders
of the Entente, which they had for moral reasons to eradicate in a “Fight for
freedom and justice of the peoples”, would simply reoccur again.
But whoever judges the world
correctly according to the facts, not according to his favorite opinions, can
know that everything that corresponds to realities has a completely different
power of persuasion than that coming from mere arbitrariness. And one can
quietly wait and see what will happen to those who will realize that with the
program of Central Europe the nations of the Entente will only lose the
opportunity to destroy Central Europe, but that it contains nothing that would
in any way be incompatible with any real living impulse of the nations of the
Entente. As long as one moves in the field of masked endeavors, an
understanding will be excluded; as soon as the realities behind the masks not
only militarily but also politically are shown, a completely different
configuration of the present events will begin. The world has become acquainted
with the armies of Central Europe for the sake of this Central Europe; the
political will, as far as Central Europe is concerned, is for the world a book
with seven seals. Instead, the world receives every day a steady stream of
horror pictures, describing what a terrible, destructive thing this Central
Europe is. And it seems to the world as if Central Europe has only to keep
silent about these horror pictures, which of course must appear to the world as
if this implies tacit agreement.
It is a matter of course that
countless objections will arise by everyone wanting to think about how what is
implied here is to be carried out in detail. However, such doubts are only to
be considered if the matter at hand were to be conceived as a program, the
realization of which was left to an individual or a society. But this is not
the case, it would indeed –contradict itself, were it so conceived.
Powers to the People
It is
conceived as the expression of what the nations of Central Europe will do, if
the governments on their part will set themselves the task of recognizing and
releasing the powers of the people. What will be done in detail is shown in
such things whenever they enter onto the path of realization. For they are not
rules of what has to be done, but predictions of what will happen, if one lets
things go to their way prescribed by their own reality. And this reality
prescribes that all religious and spiritual-cultural matters, including the
question of nationality, are to be administrated by corporations, to which the
individual person freely choses to adhere to, and which are administered as
corporations in his parliament, so that this parliament has only to do with the
corporation in question, but never with the corporation's relationship with the
individual person. And never must a corporation have anything to do with a
person belonging to another corporation under the same point of view. Such
corporations are included in the domain of parliament when they unite a certain
number of persons. Until then, they remain a matter of privacy, in which no
authority or representational body has to interfere. For whom it is a sour
apple, that from such points of view all spiritual matters of culture must in
the future be without privileging, will have no choice but to bite into this
sour apple for the salvation of the common good. Through the ever-growing
habituation to this privileging, it is difficult to see in many circles that
one has to return from the privileging of especially the cultural-spiritual
professions to the good old, ancient principle of free corporation. It is true
that a corporation is to make a person proficient in his profession, but the
exercise of this profession is not to be privileged but left to free
competition and free human choice. This will be difficult to see for all those
who are fond of saying that people are not ripe for this and that. In reality,
this objection will not be taken into account, since, with the exception of the
necessary liberal professions, the corporation will decide on the choice of
petitioners. Neither will insurmountable difficulties crop up with regard to
the political and economic spheres during the realization of what is intended
here. How, for example, educational institutions must come into being which in
their guidelines affect, apart from the actual pedagogy, the two [political and
economic] representations, is the responsibility of the superior senate.
THE SECOND MEMORANDUM - Addressed to the Austrian-Hungarian Government (Second version)
"No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which
it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose
of securing those who inhabit it a fair change of life and liberty. No
indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for
manifest wrong done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will
tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples […] And then the
free peoples of the world must draw together […] in a common covenant, some
genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their force to
secure power and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The
brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be a
structure of force and reality.”
That is
how Mr. W. Wilson describes what is to become reality through America entering
the war. Captivating words they are, with which every reasonable human being
would wholeheartedly agree. If they were written down by a literary
humanitarian for the edification of a reading circle, one could stand still by
their self-evident recognition. With the gesture of a moralist one could also
assert that whoever wants to object to this could not be a friend of progress and
freedom. Voices can even be heard today emphasizing that this war has taught
us: Only those acknowledging such or
similar ideals and acting accordingly are shaping advanced, contemporary
policy.
All talk about “views” and that this
or that view would have to be represented because one believes in them never
leads to a basis for practical action. The only thing that suffices for that
purpose is to sharply envisage reality.
For the citizens of the Central European states a discourse about the
"universal human" justification of the goals the Entente pursues, as
it were about their "beauty," can be of no value, but only the
knowledge of their balance of power in the life of the peoples. This is why, in
the following, the focus is on the actual form of the aims of the Entente as
they affect Europe, regardless of the fact that what is said here cannot sound
pleasant to the leaders of the Entente. Only through such objective thinking
can one come to practical impulses. Things will have to be spelled out somewhat
sharply due to the reasons given. It should be pointed out explicitly that
existing sentiments are not to play any role in this formulation, but only the
sober observation of the facts in
recent decades. To understand what the Entente will, must become the
basis for the guidelines of Central Europe; to be blinded by what it says leads
to the worst possible mistakes.
It is, in any case, an ungrateful
task to be compelled to turn against ideas which seem to have won over to a high degree the hearts and minds of the
people. Which ideas, in addition, appear to be the result of the "true
historical development of mankind to most noble democracy." And yet the
following must be built on the basis that the acknowledgment of Wilson's will
must be a logical burden not only for the citizens of the Central and Eastern
European nations, but also to the effect that each and every action and measure
taken during this war and thereafter must be taken in such a way that the will
of Wilson and the Entente must break in the face of the health and fertility of
these measures and actions.
The Entente aspires to hide the true
nature of its war goals; in the way that Mr. Wilson has expressed his will,
they are mixed in a questionable manner. We are dealing with the former at the
same time when we are concerned with the latter. The time has not come for a
conceptual refutation – no matter how brilliant – of Wilson's
"program". It is at present not a matter of disputes to decide who is
right or wrong. The only thing that counts here is what is happening or what
carries the seed of what is happening. And thoughts which are conceived and
spoken in Central Europe as seeds for the action of today and tomorrow are only
of value if they are held in this sense.
Wilson's words are not those of a
literary friend. They are the flag covering the deeds for which the Americans
are arming, and which the Entente has undertaken for three years against
Central Europe. The facts are such that Central Europe has to fight against
that which claims to march into battle behind this flag for the salvation of
mankind, for the peoples’ liberation. The Entente and Wilson say what they claim to be fighting for.
Their words have persuasive power.
Their propaganda is getting more and more questionable. There are people in
Central Europe who certainly do not want to admit to be repeating Wilson, yet
whose ideas are not unlike his words.
Whoever knows the origin of this war
in a deeper sense can do nothing else but stress the necessity that the
Entente-Wilson program be sharply rejected by Central Europe on the basis of
facts. For the real prospect of this program, in addition to its moral
blinding, is that it wants to use the instincts of the Central and Eastern European
nations to bring these peoples into economic dependence on Anglo-Americanism by
morally and politically overpowering them. The spiritual dependency would then
only be the necessary real consequence. Whoever knows that in English initiated
circles[2]
since the last century the term "the coming world war" has been
referred to as the event which must bring the Anglo-American race to a position
of world domination, cannot attach any value to the claim made by the leaders
of the Entente that this war had taken them by surprise, or that they had wanted
to prevent it, even if these assurances were
to have subjective truth among those who are presently speaking. For those
who spoke of “the coming world war" as an inevitable event reckoned with
the real historical and national forces of Europe. They reckoned with the
instincts of the European, especially the Slavic peoples. And they wanted to
direct and use the ideals of these
Slavic peoples in such a way that they could be of service to the national
egoism of Anglo-Americanism. They reckoned furthermore with the decline of
Romanity, on whose ruins they would spread out. They thus reckoned with
generous, historical and nationalistic points of view which they intended to
place at their service. And these goals lead, even though this is still so
strongly denied on the part of the Entente, to the purpose of crushing the
Central European states.
The right thing is to emphasize
quite soberly that the goal of the Entente leaders is to crush Central Europe,
for only the emphasis on this goal
can be the answer to the so effective statements of the Entente; but an answer
which in a certain sense is negative, because it wants to disprove what is said
by the Entente, has no value. Therefore, the following answer should be
positive, that is, to point out the facts with which Central Europe confronts
the Entente.
A Positive Answer of Central Europe
It is
only the realization that this is so that Central Europe can bring the impulses
to bear that lead out of the present chaos. The Central European states can
only take the view that the Entente program is to be rendered ineffective by
its own measures. This Entente program, whether more or less pronounced or
unpronounced, rests on three assumptions:
(1) that the historically developed
Central European state structures may not – from the standpoint of the Entente
– be recognized as having the responsibility to resolve the European
nationality problems;
(2) that these Central European
states must not be economically competitive, but instead dependent on
Anglo-Americanism;
(3) that the cultural (spiritual)
relations of Central and Eastern Europe are to be organized in the sense of the
national egoism of Anglo-Americanism.
Only he who is able to recognize
that Wilson’s letter to the Russians is the translation of these three points
into the language of the Entente comprehends what it is about.
It could also be that, forced by the
course of events, we are going to get a peace in the near future. Perhaps when
England sees that it can no longer sustain itself without giving its consent to
end the war. This does not change in essence anything on the part of
Anglo-Americanism. If this Anglo-Americanism finds it possible to continue the
war, then it will further clothe the three above-mentioned points into the
formula of Wilson's letter: "For these things we can afford to pour our
blood and money. For these are the things we have always professed to desire,
and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed we may never be able
to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human
liberty." If the leading powers of England are forced in the near future
to let the war draw to a close, then the future policy, shaped according to the
three above-mentioned points, will be encapsulated in the formula: “For the sake
of the liberation of mankind we have been willing to sacrifice money and blood and have also done so to a high degree, while
the Central European powers were only concerned about the opposite. Our goal
stands undiminished before our eyes, because it is the goal of mankind.”
What actually lies behind these
intentions will only really be met by acting practically in Central Europe
according to the realization: In the West the rule of Anglo-Americanism is
called liberation of mankind and democracy. And because this is done, one
creates the appearance of wanting to be a real liberator of mankind. Effective
against the consequences of this
monstrous deception, against the consequences of a self-evident racial egoism
in the garb of an impossible morality can only be the attitude of Central
Europe towards the whole truth of the facts. And this truth is:
1. When the objectives of the
Entente with regard to the Central European state structures are attained, real
European freedom will be lost. For they can
realize these state structures, because it is in the interest of these state
structures themselves, and states cannot act otherwise than in their own
interests. Anglo-Americanism cannot realize this national freedom because, as
soon as it exists, it acts against the interests of the Anglo-American states,
so long as these interests are such as they are now, and as this war has marked
them with actual necessity. The Anglo-American states have to recognize that
they must respect besides them the interests of the Central European states,
and that they must leave the constitutional order of Central European national
freedom up to the Central European states, which can see their real national
interest only in the promotion of this freedom.
2. From the Central European point
of view this war is towards the east a war between nations, towards the west –
against England and America – an economic war. The war of revenge against
France was only made possible by the combination of the revenge idea with the
Anglo-American economic interests and the Russian-Slavic national ideals.
3. National liberation is possible.
But it can only be the result, not
the basis of human liberation. Once
human beings are liberated, then through them the nations will become
liberated.
If it is willing do so, Central
Europe can act in the sense of these three basic principles. And its action will be a factual program; it
will act accordingly by pitting an objective program for the liberation of
mankind against the program of Wilson and the Entente that speaks without any
knowledge of the Central European nations about something that has no basis in
fact, but only exists in the aspirations of Anglo-American racism. The program
that is deemed right for Central Europe is not radical in the sense that
radicalism is feared by many circles. Rather, it is only an expression of the
facts which are to be realized on their own accord in Central Europe. They
should be realized fully consciously and not be kept secret so as to yet strive
in the mist of the Entente and Wilson’s objectives against their realization on
their own accord, thereby become corrupted and becoming the impetus and pretext
for warlike complications.
The proper implementation will never
happen, if what Central Europe must be willing to do is concealed by the
unnatural mixture of political, economic and general human interests.
For the political conditions, if
they are to flourish, demand a healthy conservatism in the sense of the
preservation and expansion of the historically established state structures.
The economic and general human interests will only be at odds with this
conservatism, which is a living condition for Central Europe, as long as they
have to suffer from their intermingling with it. And the political conservatism,
when it is concerned with its true interests, has not the slightest reason to
let itself continually be interfered with in dealing with its legitimate sphere
by the merger with economic and general human interests. If this mixture
ceases, the economic and general human conditions are reconciled with the
political conservatism, and the latter can quietly develop according to its own
nature.
The economic conditions demand, if
they are to prosper, a sense of opportunism, which brings about its order solely
according to its own nature. It must lead to conflicts, if the economic
measures are related to political and general human requirements other than in
the context resulting in their own laws and administrations required by the
self-evident contexts of life itself. What is meant here are not merely
domestic conflicts, but predominantly those which are discharged outwards in
political difficulties and military explosions.
The general human conditions and the
related questions of national liberation demand as a basis for their
realization the freedom of the individual, now and in the future. On this
point, one will not even begin to hold an objective view, as long as one
believes that freedom of the people or national liberation can be spoken of
without building upon the individual freedom of human beings and as long as one
does not also realize that this real individual liberation necessarily gives
rise to national liberation, because the latter must come about naturally as a
result of the former. The individual human being must be able to connect
himself with a people, a nation, with a religions community, with every sort of
cultural context which results from his general human aspirations, without him
being prevented from making this choice by a political or economic connection
through the structure of the state.
It is important to understand that all forms of state structures are
historically capable of realizing human liberation, if it is shown to them that
this is in their own interests. This is eminently the case with the Central
European states. A parliamentary arrangement of these states may be regarded as
necessary for reasons of the development of the times we live in and public
sentiment. Only the characterized tripartite of the state structure can cope
with the questions that in the face of these vicissitudes of war must now be thrown into the public arena. The
mere question of parliamentarism does not alter the conditions that have led to
the present chaos. The western nations speak so much about this, because they
do not understand the conditions of the Central European countries, and believe
that what is right for them must serve as a model for the whole world. For
Central Europe, even if parliamentarism is to prevail, applies a form in which the
political, economic, and the general human conditions unfold independently in
legislation and administration, thus mutually supporting each other, instead of
becoming entangled in their external effects and erupting in disputes. Central
Europe frees itself and the world from such conflict material, if it excludes
the implied mutual interference of the three human forms of life in its state
structures. No Entente objectives and no Wilsonian goals can come up against
the force exhibited by Central Europe when it presents to the world what it
alone can do and what no one else can accomplish. The liberation of mankind,
and thus that of the nations will be placed before the world as a necessary
part of the Central European states and peoples' instincts when, as indicated
here, they are thrown into the present events as a fact-provoking impulse.
What is stated here is not to be
presented as an Utopian program and shall not eradicate any historical rights
and legal structures. It represents for the person carefully studying it
something that, with complete respect for all historical justifications and
acknowledgement of the real conditions, can grow without any reservations out
of the current state structures. It is, therefore, a matter of course that what is to be carried out here does not enter
into any details. Such details emerge with really practically conceived
impulses only in the execution. Only an utopist can conceive in detail,
therefor his propositions sprung from abstract thinking, cannot be carried out.
What is said
here can only occur in general guidelines. These guidelines, however, have not
been devised, but gleaned from the living conditions in Central Europe. This
guarantees that they will prove themselves precisely when they are put into
practice. What is said here is to a certain extent already present as a
necessity of life. It is only a matter of serving these necessities. And that
is why it is now unnecessary to speak about the details, because this is an
internal matter of the Central European states. At this moment, it is necessary
to assert only as much of this matter before the world as is of significance outwardly. What is important is to show
what impulses really live in Central Europe and to show that in such a way that
the Western adversaries see that by continuing the war they must find
themselves confronted by these indestructible impulses. The leaders of the
Entente are thereby confronted with something, not merely held to account, with
which they have until now not been confronted and which they cannot conquer on
their part by any war program. When such a factual discourse as is meant here,
is brought before the world, it must have consequences.
The accommodation with Russia at the
present moment does not need to be sought for in this context, for this
accommodation must in the course of events result by itself. And the insight
that such a result must occur will give impulses to the Russian leaders, which
can only have favorable outcomes.
With all this in mind, it must
always be taken into consideration what the implied remarks mean, not so much
an internal affair, but rather an outward manifestation for putting an end to
the present global conflict, especially in the political struggle with the
manifestations of the Entente leaders and Wilson. In this case, the internal
affairs are in a similar sense taken into consideration as the actual effects
of a man's thinking are a reality for other people, even though his way of
thinking is only an internal matter of
his organism. But he only needs to discuss the effect of his thinking with others, not the constitution of his
inner being.
To recognize and accept in legislation, administration,
and social structure, the separation of the political, economic, and general
human spheres as the goal of the aspirations of Central Europe – that is what
paralyzes the forces of the Western powers. This compels them beside the European Central powers and
the Eastern powers which are associated with the latter under such conditions,
to conceive a relation in which the Western powers are limited to giving
themselves in the sphere of their national instincts the structure appropriate
to them (as state structures) and to
let the Central and Eastern European peoples live out their commonalities in
the sense of real human liberation also within the space which is naturally
allotted to them, without the disturbance that was the cause of this war. This
in contrast to the current situation in which the Western powers believe it is
only their will which can be
proclaimed as the paramount factor in the global conflict.
It all comes down to understand how
different the relations between states and peoples and also individuals develop
when these relations are based on the external effect that follows from the separation
of the three factors of life than when in this external effect the conflicts
are embroiled which result from their mixture. In future, the history of this
war will namely be written in such a way that it will be shown how the war has
been the result of the unfortunate mutual disturbance of the three spheres of
life in international relations.
Upon their separation, the external
power of one life sphere harmonizes the others; in particular the economic
interests balance out conflicts arising on political grounds, and the general
human interests can unfold their power of international integration, whereas
especially this power is rendered entirely ineffective when it must act
outwardly while burdened with political and economic conflicts. In recent times,
nothing has been the subject of greater illusions than this last point. It was
not understood that general human relations can only unfold their true power
externally, if they are built up internally on the basis of free corporations. They are then active in conjunction with the
economic interests in such a way that as a result thereof something is
developed in a natural, living manner what is now to be given a dubious future
through the creation of utopian supranational organizations: utopian courts of
arbitration, a Wilsonian “League of Nations”, which can lead to nothing else
but the continual majorization of Central Europe by the other states. Such
things suffer from the mistake from which suffers everything that is imposed on
the facts by wishful thinking, while with what is meant here a development is given free rein that from the facts itself
aspires to be realized, and which can therefore also be realized.
The
following as in the First Memorandum from the paragraph starting with "If
this is recognized..”. to the paragraph
ending with, “as if this implied tacit agreement.” "The conclusion of the
Second Memorandum reads:
:...
It is quite natural that innumerable misgivings will arise for many against
what is presented here. But such
reservations would only come into consideration if what is presented here were
intended as a program, the realization of which should be undertaken by an
individual or a society. But it is not
conceived in this way; indeed, it refutes itself if it were conceived in this
way. It is meant as an expression of what the peoples of Central Europe will do
when governments set themselves the task of recognizing and releasing the
forces of the people. What will happen
in detail is always revealed in such things when they set out on the path of
realization. For they are not
prescriptions about something that has to happen, but predictions of what will
happen if one lets things go on their course demanded by their own reality. And this own reality prescribes with regard
to all religious and spiritual-cultural matters, to which the national also
belongs: administration by corporations to which the individual person
professes to belong of his own free will and which are administered in their
parliaments as corporations, so that this parliament has to do only with the
corporation in question, but never with the relationship of this corporation to
the individual person. And never may a
corporation deal with a person belonging to another corporation from the same
point of view. Such corporations are admitted to the
parliamentary circle when they unite a certain number of persons. Until then,
they remain private matters in which no authority or representation has to
interfere. For whom it is a sour apple that from such points of view all
intellectual cultural affairs must in future be deprived of privileges, he will
have to bite into this sour apple for the salvation of the people's
existence. As people become more and
more accustomed to this privileging, it will be difficult to understand in wide
circles that we must return from the privileging of the intellectual
professions to the good old, age-old principle of free corporation, and that
the corporation should indeed make a man capable in his profession, but that
the exercise of this profession must not be privileged, but left to free
competition and free human choice, this will be difficult to understand for all
those who like to talk about people not being ready for this or that. In reality, this objection will not come into
consideration anyway, because, with the exception of the necessarily free
professions, the corporations will decide on the choice of the petitioners. Nor
can difficulties arise in the political and economic spheres that cannot be
remedied in real terms in the realization of what is intended. How, for example, pedagogical institutions
must come into being, which in their guidelines touch the two representations
not including the actual pedagogy in themselves, that is a matter for the
superior senate. All individual institutions, as they are conceived here, can
be achieved by expanding the historically given factors, which need not be
eliminated or radically replaced by others in any country of Central Europe. In
the existing, the points can be found everywhere, which, pursued in the
direction indicated, result in the liberation of peoples on the basis of the
liberation of man. To "prove"
here that what has been said is "correct" would be absurd; for this
correctness must result from the fact of its realization. The next realization would be the confession
of these impulses in an authoritative place. No one need be afraid that even
this open avowal will have a tremendous effect favorable to the Central
European states. On the contrary, one
can calmly wait and see what the Entente leaders will do (not say) when they
are confronted with this open avowal.
They will have to reckon with it in a different way than they have
reckoned with everything that has so far emanated from Central Europe. Up to now, they only had to reckon with
Central Europe's success in arms; they should also reckon with its political
will. Whoever thinks of what is indicated here in a really practical sense,
that is, in harmony with the actual conditions, will find that a basis has been
created on which even such complicated questions as the Austrian language
question - including the state and lingua franca - and the German colonial
questions can rest. For what has been
thought of here avoids the mistake that has always been made up to now, namely,
that one thought of a solution to such questions before one had created the
factual foundations on which a solution could be built. Up to now, one always proceeded to build the
first floor of a house without thinking about the ground floor.
This ground floor, however, is for
the Central European states the recognition of their naturally necessary
structure in conservative-historical-political representation and
administration, separated from the organization of the opportunistic-economic
and the spiritual-cultural element. If
one stands firm on this ground, then only on this basis one can speak of
parliamentarism, democratism and the like. For these things do not become
different in themselves, whether they are the expression of a mixture of the
political, economic and spiritual-cultural elements, which is impossible in
Central Europe in the long run, or that of the natural division of these
elements. - It is precisely by the
effect which an open avowal in this sense would produce on the leaders of the
Entente that one could see, when this effect occurs, how one stands on the real
ground of the facts with this avowal.* No one who thinks out of the real
conditions of Central Europe will doubt the practicability of what is given in
this presentation. For here nothing is
demanded "as a program," but it is only shown what wants to be
carried out, and what succeeds at the very moment when it is given a free
course. If the Entente-Wilson peace formula were replaced by that which is the
essence of this formula without a mask, the following would come out: "We
Anglo-Americans want the world to be as we wish it. Central Europe must submit
to this wish." This unmasked peace
formula shows that Central Europe had to be driven into war. If the Entente were to win, Central Europe's
development would be extinguished.
If Central Europe adds to the
invincibility of its weapons, as an offer of peace to the world, the most
unconditional intention to realize what only Central Europe can realize in
Europe, the liberation of peoples through the liberation of people, then this
Central Europe can counter the talk of "the rights and freedom of
peoples" with the real, true word: "We fight for our rights and
freedom, and the realization of these goods of humanity, which we cannot and
will not allow to be taken from us, does not by its very nature impair any real
right and freedom of another. For what
we will want will carry the guarantee of it in itself.
If you Western peoples can come to an understanding
with us on this basis, and if you Eastern peoples see that we want nothing
other than you yourselves, if only you understand yourselves, then tomorrow
peace will be possible."
Note: The beginning agrees with the second version printed above, only the paragraphs, beginning with “All talk about ‘ views’” and the one beginning with “The right thing is to emphasize quite soberly” occur only in the second version. The conclusion of the first version reads:
Central Europe can, if it wants, act in the sense of these three foundations, and its action will be a program of facts. It will act in this way if it opposes a factual program of the liberation of humanity to the Entente-Wilson dazzle program. Such a program is not radical in the sense in which one is frightened by any radicalism in certain circles. It is rather only an expression of the facts which want to be realized by their own force in Central Europe. They should be realized with full consciousness, not kept hidden, in order to strive nevertheless in the fog of the Entente-Wilson goals towards their realization by their own nature and thereby be corrupted.
The realization will never happen if what Central Europe must want remains concealed by the unnatural mixture of political, economic and general human interests.
For the political conditions, if they are to prosper, demand conservatism in the sense of the preservation and construction of the state structures which have become historical.
Economic and general human interests resist this conservatism only as long as they have to suffer from it. When this suffering ceases, they reconcile themselves to it, because they learn to see its necessity.
Economic conditions demand for their prosperity opportunism, which brings about their order only according to their own nature. Conflicts must arise when economic measures are connected with political or general human requirements and this connection is such that it thwarts economic development.
The general human conditions and the conditions of the peoples demand the individual freedom of man in the sense of the present and the future. Man must be able to profess his allegiance to a nation, to a religious community, to some other context connected with his general human aspirations, without being held back in this profession from his political or economic context by the structure of the state.
It is important to realize that all forms of state structure, as historically evolved, are capable of carrying out the liberation of mankind, if they are dependent on it by their own interest not to serve merely racial egoism. A parliamentary representation of a people may be desirable for reasons of the development of the times, but it does not change the conditions which have led to the present chaos, if in this parliament the political, the economic and the general human conditions continually interfere with each other. And Central Europe, by its very nature, strives to exclude such disturbances. No entente, no Wilsonian aims can arise in the face of the power that lies in the realization of the European instincts for freedom through Central Europe. For these instincts for freedom are the germ of the European national freedoms, not the Wilsonian ideas.
To recognize and accept the legislation, administration and social structure, the separation of the political, economic, general-human as the goal of the Central European aspirations, that paralyzes the Western powers, that forces them, alongside the European Central Powers, in their union with Eastern Europe, to profess peace. This allows these Western powers to limit themselves to seeking the social structure appropriate to them in the area of their national instincts, and to let the Central and Eastern Europeans live out their national commonalities in the sense of the real liberation of humanity also within the space which has become historical for them.
The parliamentarism which is necessary for Central Europe will come about when one no longer regards it as the first priority, but as the consequence, as it must come about when one recognizes as the first priority the division [of the social organism] into the political-military sphere ,which orders its relation to other states according to its nature just as much as to the internal national structure, into the economic sphere, which is ordered opportunistically according to its own nature, i.e. is represented and administered legislatively in this sense, and into the general-human sphere, which is built upon the corporations to which man professes himself in the sense of his own free sentiment.
The abstract League of Nations with its Utopian courts of arbitration could lead to nothing else than the continuous majorization of Central Europe by the other states. The ordering of the relations in Central Europe in the sense of the separation of powers leads to the continuing balance of the interests of mankind anchored in the peoples. With the Wilsonian League of Nations institutions ae created which must suffer from the catastrophe which is always the case when human wishful thinking is imposed on the facts; one does not create such institutions with what the whole nature of the Central and Eastern European peoples is urging, but one liberates therewith what liberates in the sense of peaceful development, but if remaining unliberated must lead to warlike conflicts. A future state of mankind cannot be created by institutions, as Wilson and the Entente want, but it will come about if one gives the facts free rein through which it can come about.
If the Entente-Wilson peace formula were replaced by what is the essence of this formula without its mask, the following would come out: "We Anglo-Americans want the world to become as we wish to see it; Central Europe must submit to this wish." - This unmasked peace formula shows that Central Europe had to be driven into war.
If the Entente were to win, Central Europe's development would be destroyed. If Central Europe adds to the invincibility of its weapons, as an offer of peace to the world, the most unconditional intention to realize what only Central Europe can realize in Europe, national liberation through human liberation, then this Central Europe can counter the talk of "the rights and freedom of peoples" with the real true words:
"We fight for our rights and our freedom. And the realization of these goods of humanity, which we cannot and will not let ourselves be deprived of, does not, by its very nature, interfere with any real right and freedom of the other; for what we will want will carry the guarantee of it in itself.
If you Western peoples can come to an understanding with us on this basis, and if you Eastern peoples see that we want nothing other than you yourselves, if you understand yourselves but rightly - then tomorrow peace is possible."
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But alas, it was not to be. Rudolf Steiner’s attempt to head a public relations bureau in Zürich as the official representative of the Central Powers to make this peace proposal widely known, had earlier already been turned down by the German Military High Command because of the fact that he was not a German, but an Austrian citizen, and the politicians lacked the willpower and insight to adopt and implement this nation-saving humanitarian idea. Rudolf Steiner’s proposal to send a threefold delegation, representing the political, economic and cultural spheres in Germany, to the negotiation table at the coming peace conference of Versailles in 1919 and his literary efforts to show that in no way Germany was alone responsible for the outbreak of the war all came to naught. Instead, Germany lost part of its territory and was saddled with huge reparations, which only served to arouse the anger and resentment of the populace and set the stage for a Second World War. So now he turned this attention to bringing this idea into the open on his own steam.
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